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CURRENT LEGISLATION
REVOCATION OF INTER Vivos TRUSTS-AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 23
OF NEW YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW AND TO SECTION 118
OF NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY LAW
For a long period in the history of New York law, trusts, once
established, were thereafter irrevocable, unless the power of revoca-
tion was expressly reserved by the settlor.1 Necessarily, as a result
of this rule, much property held in trust was rendered virtually in-
alienable. In an expression of public policy against this curtailment
on the free alienability of property the New York Legislature en-
acted Section 23 of the Personal Property Law and Section 118 of
the Real Property Law, authorizing the revocation of a trust upon
the written consent of all persons "beneficially interested" in it.2
The public policy embodied in these statutes is so strong that a
trust might be revoked even though the settlor declared it to be
irrevocable.3
In the application of these statutory provisions much emphasis
was understandably placed on the construction of the words "bene-
ficially interested." In Pulsifer v. Monges 4 it was decided that con-
tingent remaindermen as well as vested remaindermen had a bene-
ficial interest. Further definition occurred in the case of Smith v.
Title Guarantee and Trust Co.5 which held that where a trust was
created for the benefit of the settlor's children, the unborn children
were not persons beneficially interested. Consequently only the con-
sent of the living members of the class was necessary for a revoca-
tion of the trust.
Although the above constructions are clear, a recurrent problem
has arisen with respect to the construction of language used in the
trust deed which directs that the principal of the trust be paid over
to the "heirs at law or next of kin" of the settlor upon the termina-
tion of certain intermediate interests.
If the language is construed as creating a remainder interest in
the living potential heirs, they have a "beneficial interest" and the
settlor may not revoke -the trust without their consent. If on the
other hand, the language is construed as reserving to the settlor a
reversion, his heirs take no interest in the trust property, and the
settlor may revoke without their consent. Thus, it becomes impor-
tant to determine whether the language of the deed creates remain-
I Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 206 (1884).
2 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 23, passed in 1909, provides: "Upon the written
consent of all the persons beneficially interested in a trust of personal property
or any part thereof heretofore or hereafter created, the creator of such trust
may revoke the same as to the whole or such part thereof, and thereupon the
estate of the trustee shall cease in the whole or such part thereof." N. Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 118, passed in 1932, has substantially the same provision.3 See Pulsifer v. Monges, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 367, 368 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
4 66 N. Y. S. 2d 367 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
s287 N. Y. 500, 41 N. E. 2d 172 (1942).
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ders in the heirs or a reversion in the settlor. This determination
has presented a long lasting and difficult problem for the courts.
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
Common Law Rule of Property
The common law had adopted a hard and fast rule of prop-
erty, known as the doctrine of "worthier title," with respect to the
solution of the problem. The early cases consistently held that such
language created a reversion in the grantor6 and no interest in the
heirs. The effect of these holdings was that the ultimate estate in
the property had never left the grantor. The basis for the rule lay
in the feudal system. Where property passed by descent, all the
incidents of the feudal custom attached to the property continued in
force; however, if the property passed by way of purchase these in-
cidents were severed.7 Naturally, the courts of the day entertained
a great reluctance to facilitate the breakdown of this basic socio-
political structure.
The common law rule was carried over to the United States
and subsisted in all its vigor long after it had been abrogated in
England.' The most fundamental basis for the rule in the United
States is found in the maxim-Nemo est haeres viventis-namely,
no one is heir to the living. If a living person had no heirs, there
was no one in being who could take an interest under the deed; the
heirs mentioned in the deed would take by operation of law upon
the death in due course of the grantor. This was the law in New
York until the case of Doctor v. Hughes.9
Substitution of a Rule of Construction
The case of Doctor v. Hughes 10 first intimated in New York a
turning away from this hard and fast rule of property. In this case
the settlor created a trust of real property, the income of which was
payable to him for life, and directed that upon his death the property,
or if sold, the proceeds, be conveyed to his heirs. The court held
that a reversion was created by the trust and stated that the rule of
"worthier title". ". . . was never applied in all its rigor to executory
6 Bedford v. Russel, Popham 3, 79 Eng. Rep. 1126 (K. B. 1593) ; Godbold
v. Freestone, 3 Lev. 406, 83 Eng. Rep. 753 (K. B. 1694) ; Godolphin v. Abingdon,
2 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Rep. 432 (Ch. 1740).
7See Note, The Rule Favoring Title by Descent Over Title by Devise,
46 HARv. L. REv. 993 (1933).
a Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S. W. 601 (1923) ; Akers v. Clark,
184 Ill. 136, 56 N. E. 296 (1900); Harris v. McLaran, 30 Miss. 533 (1855).
The rule was abrogated in England in 1833. 3 & 4 Will. 4c. 106, § 3.
9 Buckley v. Buckley, 11 Barb. 43 (N. Y. 1850).10225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919).
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trusts . . . which were moulded by the court as best to answer the
intent of the person creating them. . . ." 1 However, the court used
language which had a profound influence on the subsequent develop-
ment of this area of the law: "But at least the ancient rule survives
to this extent, that to transform into a remainder what would ordi-
narily be a reversion, the intention to work the transformation must
be clearly expressed." 12 What was intimated in Doctor v. Hughes,
namely, that the courts should give effect to the clearly expressed in-
tention of the settlor, was soon confirmed as a legal proposition.13
Before long the doctrine of worthier title as qualified by the Doctor
v. Hughes doctrine was applied to personal property.14 Thus were
the courts precipitated upon the task of intention-seeking. The case
of Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co.15 represents one of the first
successful attempts to spell out the requisite intent. Three settlors
had set up a trust for two life beneficiaries. At the termination of
the trust, the principal was to be returned to the settlors, but in the
event that anyone of them predeceased the life tenants, the principal
was to be distributed according to his will, or if no will, then accord-
ing to the laws of intestacy. The court felt that the settlor's inten-
tion to create a remainder was clearly expressed, and pointed out
four factors by which it was impressed: (1) no provision was made
to pay the principal to the grantee or assignee of the settlor, (2) the
settlor had made a full and formal disposition of the estate at the
time of the instrument, (3) the settlor reserved only the right of
testamentary disposition, and, (4) the trust principal could not be
divested by deed or assignment of the settlor.
Although it is strongly arguable that all these elements may
consistently be contained in a trust deed purporting to establish a
reversion,'" some courts have viewed the decision as a lucid process
of determining the settlor's intent.17 That it was something less may
be seen by a view of some subsequent decisions.
Not long afterwards a case was decided which involved essen-
tially the same ingredients as the Whittemore case. The settlor set
up a trust, the income of which was payable to himself for life, the
principal to be paid according to his will or by the laws of intestacy,
if he left no will. The court held that the trust was revocable, dis-
tinguishing the Whittemore case by merely saying that there was no
satisfactory evidence of an intent in the instant case to create a re-
11 Id. at 311, 122 N. E. at 222.
12 Id. at 312, 122 N. E. at 222. [Emphasis added.]
13 Gage v. Irving Bank and Trust Co., 222 App. Div. 92, 225 N. Y. Supp.
476 (2d Dep't 1927), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 554, 162 N. E. 522 (1928).
14 Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 280 N. Y. 43, 19 N. E. 2d 673
(1939).
'1 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
16 See Mariash, Revocation of Inter Vivos Trusts in New York, A Study
in Confusion, 16 B'xi.YN L. RFv. 41, 45-9 (1949).
'1 See Hammond v. Chemung Canal Trust Co., 141 Misc. 158, 160, 252
N. Y. Supp. 259, 261 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
1951 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
mainder.18 That the Whittemore case settled little can further be
seen by an evaluation of two cases decided by the Appellate Division,
First Department, on the same day.
In Davies v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.19 the settlor set up
a trust for herself for life, the principal to be distributed according
to her last will and testament, or in the absence of such, then accord-
ing to the laws of intestacy. The court held that this trust agree-
ment created a reversion, and that the settlor could revoke without
the consent of anyone.
The Beam v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 20 case in-
volved a very similar devise. The court, adopting the language of
the Whittemore case that there was a full and formal disposition of
the property, held that a remainder had been created. These deci-
sions, based on apparently the same fact situations, clearly show that
the court was subject to vacillation in the application of principles.
The continued search for the settlor's intention further augmented
the confusion. Rather artificial rules were conceived to ascertain in-
tention, but, apparently, not even these received universal approbation.
Some Rules of Construction
A review of some of them will highlight the quandary in which
the courts found themselves as a result of abandoning the doctrine
of "worthier title." As a general proposition, it has been held that
where the settlor retains the right to invade the corpus of the trust
for his own benefit a reversion results.2 ' This is a plausible con-
struction under the rule enunciated in Doctor v. Hughes that the in-
tention to create a remainder must be clearly expressed. Not only
does the provision fail to negate the presumption in favor of a re-
version, but lends force to it. Yet, in Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co.22
the court adopted a similar provision as a basis for finding an inten-
tion to create a remainder. While it is true that in the Engel case
the settlor did not specifically reserve the right to invade the entire
corpus, the decision cast such doubt on the existing rule as to render
it of little aid in construction.
Another test frequently resorted to by the courts was the de-
termination of whether the class to take, although denominated heirs
or next of kin, was in any way distinct from the ordinary distri-
butees of the settlor. If it was, its members were deemed to take
a remainder interest. This test led the courts to find remainder in-
terests in heirs or next of kin who were, according to the trust deed,
28 Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 235 App. Div. 170, 256
N. Y. Supp. 563 (lst Dep't), aff'd, 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83 (1932).19248 App. Div. 380, 288 N. Y. Supp. 398 (lst Dep't 1936).
20248 App. Div. 182, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403 (lst Dep't 1936).
21 Matter of Gordon v. Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 272 App. Div. 565,
72 N. Y. S. 2d 914 (lst Dep't 1947).
22280 N. Y. 43, 19 N. E. 2d 673 (1939).
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to be identified by the laws of a state other than that in which the
settlor died,2 3 or to be ascertained at a time different from the date
of his death.24
However, the efficacy of these tests was soon compromised, and
a lack of decisional harmony once again evidenced itself. With re-
spect to the first of the aforementioned tests, where a New York
resident directs that the principal be distributed to his heirs according
to the New York law of intestacy, it has been held that he has created
a remainder, for he may die elsewhere and hence has in effect specified
a class different from his normal distributees; 25 and contrariwise,
under the same facts it has been held that such a direction does not
of necessity create a remainder.20 The second of the above tests was
enigmatized by a holding that the ascertainment of the class of heirs
at the end of the life estate rather than at the death of the settlor was
not conclusive of the creation of a remainder interest.2
7
Attempts to Establish Policy
Contemporaneous with the confusion in applying specific rules,
the appellate courts suffered from the inability to define the broad
general principles.
After the statement of the rule in Doctor v. Hughes that the in-
tention of the settlor must be clearly expressed, the case of Engel v.
Guaranty Trust Co. 28 further qualified the ancient rule of "worthier
title" by stating that the rule "... . is with us no more than a prima
facie precept of construction which may serve to point the intent of
the author, when the interpretation of a writing like this trust agree-
ment is not otherwise plain. . . . it must give place to a sufficient
expression [emphasis added] by a grantor of his purpose to make a
gift of a remainder to those who will be his distributees." 2' Thus
the rule that the presumption in favor of a reversion could be offset
only by a clearly expressed intention to create a remainder, was re-
duced to a mere rule of construction favoring the finding of a rever-
sion where the evidence in favor of both reversion and remainder
was substantially in balance. The coexistence of these two rules was
so productive of confusion that a justice of the Appellate Division
23 Minc v. Chase National Bank, 263 App. Div. 141, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 592
(1st Dep't 1941) ; Hopkins v. Bank of New York, 261 App. Div. 465, 25 N. Y.
S. 2d 888 (1st Dep't 1941).24 Hussey v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.. 236 App. Div. 117, 258 N. Y.
Supp. 396 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 261 N. Y. 533, 185 N. E. 726 (1933); In re
City Farmers Trust Co., 69 N. Y. S. 2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1947).25 Minc v. Chase National Bank of New York, 263 App. Div. 141, 31 N. Y.
S. 2d 592 (1st Dep't 1941).
26 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 278 N. Y. 134, 15 N. E. 2d 553(1938).
27 Fish v. Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 270 App. Div. 251, 59 N. Y. S.
2d 62 (1st Dep't 1945); Green v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 72 N. Y. S.
2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
28280 N. Y. 43, 19 N. E. 2d 673 (1939).
29 Id. at 47, 19 N. E. 2d at 675. [Emphasis added.]
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admitted that there was great difficulty in distinguishing between re-
versions and remainders.3 0 As further evidence of the interminable
vacillation, the rule of Doctor v. Hughes was subsequently reaffirmed
in Matter of Scholtz v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.31
Perhaps laboring under the pain of exasperation, the Court of
Appeals in Richardson v. Richardson 3 2 undertook the heroic task of
reviewing the history of the problem for the purpose of clarifying
the principles. After indicating an intention to follow the Engel
case again, the court set down four indicia for determining intent,
substantially the same as those found in the Whittemore case: (1) the
settlor made a full and formal disposition of the trust property,
(2) she made no reservation of a power to grant or assign an in-
terest in the property during her lifetime, (3) she surrendered all
control over the trust property except the power to make a testa-
mentary disposition thereof, and (4) she made no provision for the
return of any part of the principal to herself during her lifetime.
Following this decision came the case of Matter of Burchel13 3
which virtually decimated the doctrine of Doctor v. Hughes. The
settlor bad established a trust with income payable to herself for life.
Upon her death the principal was to go to the persons appointed by
her will, or in lieu of a will, to the settlor's next of kin by the laws
of intestacy. The deed further provided that the settlor as evidence
of her consent and approval should join in certain conveyances by
the trustees. Deeming this latter provision not to be controlling, the
court went on to say: ". . . the presumption which exists from the
use of the common-law doctrine as a rule of construction has lost
much of its force since Doctor v. Hughes. . . . Evidence of intent
need not be overwhelming in order to allow the remainder to stand." 34
The court also stated that the opinion in the Richardson case had
indicated some criteria for finding the requisite intent, but it made
particular reference only to one, namely, that the settlor had reserved
only a testamentary power of disposition over the trust principal.
This decision indicates the court's willingness to find a remainder
where this is the only factor present. By its decision the court virtu-
ally obliterated all distinctions between reversions and remainders.
As a result of this decision, which has made the tests so tenuous,
many a settlor will be entrapped into creating remainders. The rules
are still not sufficiently clear to put a settlor on notice as to what he
is creating by his deed of trust.
The Amendments
Because of the courts' inability to define clear-cut rules of con-
struction, interminable litigation has occurred. Each trust deed,
30 See opinion of Calahan, J., in Julier v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co., 272 App. Div. 598, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 262 (1st Dep't 1947).
31295 N. Y. 488, 492, 68 N. E. 2d 503, 505 (1946).
32298 N. Y. 135, 81 N. E. 2d 54 (1948).
33299 N. Y. 351, 87 N. E. 2d 293 (1949).
34 Id. at 360, 87 N. E. 2d at 297.
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which a settlor attempted to revoke, had to be submitted as a matter
of course to judicial scrutiny lest the trustee run the risk of liability
to interested parties. Private persons on the basis of the decisional
law could not venture a safe guess as to the ultimate construction
of the instrument in question.
Additionally, the public policy favoring revocability of trusts has
been largely hampered, if not frustrated, by the lack of harmony
in the decisions. Whenever the heirs were declared to have a re-
mainder interest, it became, in many instances, virtually impossible
to identify them, much less successfully obtain the consents of all of
them. Some of the courts, perhaps cognizant of this almost insur-
mountable difficulty, established the rule that only the consent of
those who were heirs at the date of revocation was needed.35 Such
a rule was never universally followed and seems to have been finally
repudiated in the case of Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co.36 Thus, since
it was impossible to ascertain a settlor's heirs in his lifetime and
since a trust is irrevocable after his death, the operative effect of
Section 23 of the Personal Property Law and Section 118 of the
Real Property Law was largely curtailed.
Faced with the realization that its previously announced man-
date had been frustrated in the courts, the New York Legislature
undertook to reassert its disposition in favor of revocability of trusts
by amending both sections of the law.37 The amendments, identical
in language, read as follows: "For the purposes of this section, a
gift or limitation, contained in a trust created on or after September
first, nineteen hundred fifty one, in favor of a class of persons de-
scribed only as heirs or next of kin or distributees of the creator of
the trust, or by other words of like import, does not create a bene-
ficial interest in such persons." (Emphasis added.)
This legislative declaration in effect states that heirs, not being
beneficially interested, are no longer persons from whom the settlor
must solicit consents in order to revoke the trust. By legislative di-
i-ection they are not to be deemed remaindermen, that is, they take
no interest in the trust property by purchase under the deed. This
is, in effect, a hearkening back to the strict common law rtile extant
before the case of Doctor v. Hughes. No room is left by the statute
for giving effect to the settlor's intention to create a remainder in-
terest. If he wishes to create a remainder, he must classify the per-
sons to take other than as "heirs or next of kin or distributees," for
the amendment states that if he describes them "only" in that fashion
they shall not take beneficial interests.
A question arises as to the construction of the word "only." A
case may arise in which the settlor employs the terms heirs or next
35 Thatcher v. Empire Trust Co., 243 App. Div. 430, 277 N. Y. Supp. 874
(1st Dep't 1935); Corbett v. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 229 App.
Div. 570, 242 N. Y. Supp. 638 (1st Dep't 1930).36280 N. Y. 43, 19 N. E. 2d 673 (1939).
3 7 Laws of N. Y. 1951, c. 180. [Emphasis added.]
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of kin but adds a qualification which would distinguish the persons
who are to take from those who would ordinarily take under the laws
of intestacy. Such a qualification might be that the heirs or next of
kin be ascertained at a time other than the death of the settlor or
according to the laws of a jurisdiction other than that in which the
settlor dies. Such qualifying language has in the past been inter-
preted by the courts as creating a remainder.3 8 It would seem that
insofar as the statute employs the word "only," a proper construc-
tion might be that the added qualification would take the situation
out of the injunction of the statute. To the extent that this is so,
the effectiveness of the amendment might be diminished. But by
and large, except where the settlor has adopted this obvious language,
the statute ought to have a salutary effect in that a uniform construc-
tion will be given to a trust whose beneficiaries are identical with
the intestate distributees of the settlor.
Conclusion
The problem of distinguishing between reversions and remain-
ders is not restricted to actions under the revocation statutes, although
most cases do arise under their provisions.3 9 Since the amendments
herein discussed are limited by sound rules of statutory construction
in their operative effect to actions brought to revoke trusts, 40 the
problem of construction is still extant.
As the legislature has arbitrarily resolved the difficulty in revo-
cation actions, it is conceivable that the courts may be inclined to
establish a judicial rule in other types of cases that would accord
with the expressed legislative attitude. However, it is believed that
the rules of construction are too deeply imbedded in our decisional
law to be uprooted by anything less than further legislative action.4 '
Notwithstanding that the new amendments do not completely
eliminate the problem, they do much to minimize its recurrence.
Additionally, they dispense with the necessity of employing artificial
rules to ascertain the settlor's intention. Certainty among settlors as
to the ultimate distribution of their property is promoted. Property
subject to trusts may be more easily freed and alienated. In these
accomplishments the new enactments will have an efficacious and
welcome effect.
38 See Minc v. Chase National Bank, 263 App. Div. 141, 31 N. Y. S. 2d
592 (1st Dep't 1941); Hopkins v. Bank of New York, 261 App. Div. 465,
25 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (1st Dep't 1941); Hussey v. City Bank Farmers Trust
Co., 236 App. Div. 117, 258 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd 261 N. Y.
533, 185 N. E. 726 (1933); In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 69 N. Y. S.
2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
39 See Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919).
40 See Tompkins v. First Nat. Bank of Penn Yan, 18 N. Y. Supp. 234
(Sup. Ct 1892).
41 See Matter of Burchell, 299 N. Y. 351, 87 N. E. 2d 293 (1949) ; Richard-
son v. Richardson, 298 N. Y. 135, 81 N. E. 2d 54 (1948).
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